I do not think that your assessment that she was "not carrying" is
legally accurate (as discussed below), although it
is physically accurate.
Cops do not always have to see a misdemeanor committed prior to having a lawful right to arrest.
Not necessarily directed at Jeff, but several of you seem to have overlooked (or do not understand) what I said about the "strict liability" of the statute.
In criminal law,
strict liability is liability for which
mens rea (Latin for "guilty mind") does not have to be proven in relation to one or more elements comprising the
actus reus (Latin for "guilty act") although intention, recklessness or knowledge may be required in relation to other elements of the offence. The liability is said to be strict because
defendants will be convicted even though they were genuinely ignorant of one or more factors that made their acts or omissions criminal. The defendants may therefore not be culpable in any real way, i.e. there is not even criminal negligence, the least blameworthy level of mens rea.
I continue to read 9.41.050 to be a strict liability statute.
More likely, they
do understand the law, but simply do not like it and want to give you grief. I, too, have been arrested (and, curiously, convicted -- although overturned on appeal) for unlawful display. The end result was that it negatively affected the offending sergeant and cost the City of Seattle a whole BOATLOAD of money (read: tens of thousands) in the settlement.
The
Keller decision is based upon well-established law and legal precedent.
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court will glean the legislative intent from the words of the statute itself. See
Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wn.2d 745, 752, 888 P.2d 147 (1995);
Smith v. N. Pac. Ry., 7 Wn.2d 652, 664, 110 P.2d 851 (1941). If the provision of a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous.
State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600-01, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). A statutory term that is left undefined should be given its “usual and ordinary meaning and courts may not read into a statute a meaning that is not there.”
State v. Hahn, 83 Wn. App. 825, 832, 924 P.2d 392 (1996). If the undefined statutory term is not technical, the court may refer to the dictionary to establish the meaning of the word.
Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 144 Wn.2d 556, 564, 29 P.3d 709 (2001). In undertaking this plain language analysis, the court must remain careful to avoid “unlikely, absurd or strained” results.
State v. Stannard, 109 Wn.2d 29, 36, 742 P.2d 1244 (1987).
An analysis of the statute begins with the plain language employed by the legislature.
Rest. Dev. v. Canwell, 150 Wn.2d at 682;
State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). The Court’s primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent deriving such intent by construing the language as a whole, giving effect to every provision. J.P at 450. If the language is unambiguous, the Court is to give effect to that language and that language alone because the Court must presume the legislature says what it means and means what it says.
State v. Radan, 143 Wn.2d 323, 330, 21 P.3d 255 (2001). Courts are obliged to apply the language of a statute as the legislature wrote it, rather than amend it by judicial construction.
GESA Credit Union v. Mutual Life, 105 Wn.2d 248, 252, 713 P.2d 728 (1986). Clearly, where the plain words of a statute are unambiguous, a court’s inquiry is at an end.
State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wn.2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010). If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and, absent legislative intent to the contrary, the rule of lenity requires a court to interpret the statute strictly
against the State and
in favor of the defendant.
State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600-01, 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
I think that the courts see this a bit differently than you, Jeff.
The entire passenger compartment of an automobile is within the occupant arrestee’s wingspan and thus within his control.
New York v Belton, 453 US 454 (1981).
The area immediately within a person’s immediate control in an automobile (the “wingspan” - an area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence) is presumptively in that person’s possession.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Agreed. The laws do
not say that the firearm must be on your person.